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rear- 1946-49: THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD
eve!- The main economic goals of the Philippine government in the immediate
postwar years were to restore prewar production levels, initiate an industrial-
rtica! ization effort, and ensure adequate supplies of essential consumption and cap-
ital goods. Table 2-1 contains a summary of the main trade, fiscal, and mone-
tary measures directed at these objectives.
1970
ReducingImports of Consumption Goods.
World War II resulted in severe devastation of the Philippine economy.
'ould As Paul McNutt (the last high commissioner from the United States) re-
I ac- ported, at the end of the war only a bare remnant of the major industrial
full equipmentwas intact; not a single sugar mill was operating; the fishing fleets
has been taken away or destroyed; rolling stock had been carried away to
Japan; and mile after mile of concrete highway had been destroyed.' In 1946,
the first year of the reconstruction period, total output was only 35percent
of its 1940 level. The mining and manufacturing sectors were especially hard
hit by the war, and 1946 production levels in those sectors were only 1 and
18 per cent, respectively, of their 1940 levels.2
Fortunately, large disbursements by the U.S. government in the form
of war damage payments, relief expenditures, veterans' pensions, and military
expenditures, as well as a remarkably rapid expansion of export proceeds
permitted the country to ease the shortage of domestically produced goods
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TABLE2-1
Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1946-49
July 1946United States—Philippines Trade Agreement providing for eight-year free-
trade period between the countries and restricting Philippines' ability
to change its exchange rate or impose exchange controls h
Sept. 1946Exemptions from domestic taxes for "new and necessary" industries
Oct. 1946Establishment of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to provide low- 0
cost loans for reconstruction and development I
June 1948Increase in the sales tax on luxury and semiluxury items (most of which
Ui
were imported) from 20 to 30 per cent and from 10 to 15 per cent, ti
respectively U
July 1948Enactment of Import Control Act, leading to imposition of import quotas
JI
on nonessential and luxury imports
Nov. 1949Imposition by Central Bank of 80 per cent margin requirement on all
letters of credit covering imports of luxury and nonessential goods a
Dec. 1949Institution of foreign-exchange controls by Central Bank p




with substantial imports. For the two years 1945 and 1946, for example, total
U.S. government expenditures of $393 million more than covered combined
imports of $364 million.3 Thereafter, the rapid rise in exports, from $64 mit- b
lion in 1946 to $327 million in 1948, coupled with continued high levels of
U.S. government expenditures and foreign aid resulted in a rise of imports
to an average of $613 million between 1947 and 1949—an average level e
that was then one-third larger than the prewar value and was not again reached
until the early 1960s. The outstanding export performance was due in large a
part to a rapid increase in export prices. The index of these prices (1937 = IS
100) rose from 156 in 1946 to 291 in 1948. The volume of exports in 1948 0
was still only 74 per cent of the 1937 level.
Policymakers were, however, concerned at the time by the high con- ti
sumption component of imports. In 1947, consumption goods made up 68
per cent of all imports (one-quarter of these were textiles), and capital goods
averaged about 10 per cent of imports. Although the share of capital goods fr
was not too different from the 14 per cent figure of 1937—40, top govern- ta
ment officials believed that this level was insufficient to meet the country's
reconstruction and development requirements. Most Philippine leaders be- W
lieved that the country needed both additional export-oriented and import-
1
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replacing production in order to meet the adjustment problem associated with
the gradual phasing out of reciprocal preferential relations with the United
States.4 Achieving these increases in production in turn required additional
imports of capital equipment. The concern of government authorities was
free- further heightened by the steady depletion of the international reserves which
,ility had been built up in 1945 from large U.S. government expenditures.
The policy options available to the Philippine government to achieve its
import-substitution goals and meet the growing deficit problem were severely
low- constrained by the provisions of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 (the Bell
Trade Act). This act, passed by the U.S. Congress shortly before the sched-
uled independence date for the Philippines (July 4, 1946), and accepted by
hich the Philippines as of that date as an Executive Trade Agreement between the
..Cfl, United States and the Philippines, provided for an eight-year period (until
July 1954) of free trade between the two countries. For the rest of 1954
otas each country was to tax imports at 5 per cent of its full rate. Beginning in 1955,
the tariff on imports was to be at 10 per cent of the full rate. Thereafter, this
iall level was to be raised by five percentage points per year until full duties would
apply as of January The act also stipulated that until 1973 the Philip-
pine government could not change the established exchange rate of 2 pesos
to per U.S. dollar, impose exchange inconvertibility, or restrict capital transfers
without explicit agreement from the President of the United States.° Since
the United States supplied 80 per cent of Philippine imports in this period, the
effect of the free-trade agreement between the countries was to rule out tariff
otal increases as a means of reducing imports. Likewise it was evident that permis-
med sion to devalue the currency or impose exchange control was likely to be given
mil- by the United States only if a severe exchange crisis developed. Two other
s of features of the act that infringed upon Philippine sovereignty were the corn-
orts mitment not to levy export taxes and the agreement to accord Americans
evel equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation and development of natural re-
hed sources and public utilities in the Philippines. As Golay remarks, the act was
irge accepted by the Filipinos because it was accompanied by another piece of leg-
7 = islationproviding for U.S. compensation for war damages suffered in the
948 country.7
Despite the constraints imposed by the Bell Act, it was not long before
the government found means other than tariffsto restrain imports. One
68 method, adopted in June of 1948, was to raise the sales tax on luxury and
ods semiluxury items—most of which were imported—from 20 to 30 per cent and
'ods from 10 to 15 per cent, respectively. The measure also stipulated that the sales
tax be paid in advance on imported articles,i.e., prior to their release by
ry's customs officials. More important as a means of limiting imports, however,
jbe- was enactment of the Import Control Act (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 330) in
July of the same year. Under this law, which was not considered to be incon-20EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
sistent with the Bell Trade Act, but was not implemented until January 1949
because of the opposition of foreign importers, President Elpidio Quirino was
authorized to establish a system of import control by regulating imports of
nonessential and luxury articles and to create an Import Control Board to
devise the necessary rules and regulations. The intent of the act was not so
much to encourage the domestic production of nonessential items, but, by re-
stricting imports of luxury goods, to permit the importation of a sufficient
volume of essential consumer goods for lower-income groups and of essential
capital goods for basic reconstruction and development needs.8
The mechanics of import restriction under the Import Control Act in-
volved placing various imports on a list of so-called luxury or nonessential
items and then requiring import licensing for these goods by the three-man
board set up under the act.9 To begin operation of the controls, the value of
imports from July 1, 1947, to July 30, 1948 was established as the base pe-
riod; and then (as of January 1949) current imports were permitted equal in
value terms to between 5and80 per cent of these base-period imports. Im-
ports of commodities that were produced locally were given the greatest per-
centage cuts. A definite share of imports was reserved for new importers, first,
without any nationality requirement, but then later only for Filipinos. Another
feature of the control system aimed at curtailing primarily luxury goods was
that import quotas for some categories of goods applied only if the c.i.f. unit
values of the items were high enough to make them among the most expensive
types of a particular class of goods.
Introduction of Exchange Controls.
Despite increases both in the range of items brought under control and
in the percentage cutbacks during the second half of the year, the volume of
imports actually was slightly larger in 1949 than in 1948. Only imports of to-
bacco products declined significantly. There was also no significant change in
the Commodity distribution of imports.1°
One reason for this failure was a shifting from high-priced to low-priced
imports of a particular commodity. Import controls applied, for example,
only to automobiles costing more than $3,500. By purchasing mainly inex-
pensive cars, importers were able to increase the value of imported cars from
$7 million to $8 million in the first half of 1949. Permitting importers to trans-
fer quotas among articles also operated to frustrate any pattern of differential
cutbacks. More fundamentally, however, the poor performance in cutting im-
ports was due to an unwillingness of the government to impose the harsh
monetary and fiscal measures needed. The year 1949 was a presidential dcc-
tion year, and one can observe at this early date the pattern of deficit spending,
increases in the money supply, and a tendency to ease controls that charac-1946—49: THERECONSTRUCTION PERIOD 21
.9 terizes election years up to the present time.'1 For example, the government
is deficit from July 1, 1949, to June 30, 1950 (elections are in November), was
$212 million compared to levels in the $50 million—$70 million range before
:o and after the election. Obviously, this deficit spending added to the pressure
for large imports. The governor of the Central Bank warned President Quirino
in early 1949 that, due to rapidly increasing imports, exchange control would
have to be imposed by the end of the year unless appropriate alternative meas-
ures were taken. However, according to the governor, no action was taken
because it was an election year.'2 Apparently, political pressures were effec-
tive in thwarting the implementation of the Import Control Act in that year.'3
al The failure to reduce imports in 1949 probably would not have resulted
in the full-scale exchange crisis which developed near the end of the year had
it not been accompanied by a sharp drop in both exports and U.S. government
expenditures. The value of exports dropped from $327 million in 1948 to
$261 million in 1949, even though the volume rose somewhat. The reason for
1- the decline in value was a sharp drop in the prices of coconut products, the
product group that made up 68 per cent of the country's exports in the 1947—
49 period. Still another factor precipitating the crisis was a capital flight near
the end of 1949 based on the fear that the Philippines would fall in line with
is the devaluation pattern followed by a number of countries in September of
it that year. 14
Thedrop in international reserves from $420 million in 1948 to $260
million in 1949 led the Central Bank, which had only opened for business on
January 3, 1949, to intervene in the exchange market immediately after the
election. First, on November 17, the bank issued Circular 19, under which
an 80 per cent margin requirement was imposed on all letters of credit cover-
ing various luxury and nonessential items. The list of items was substantially
the same as the one that formed the basis for the initial implementation of the
Import Control Act. Commercial banks were also prohibited from granting
.fl credit facilities either directly or indirectly for the purpose of providing the
margin requirements. Next, on December 9, 1949, the Central Bank instituted
foreign-exchange controls by issuing Circular 20 under the authority vested in
e, the bank by the act (R.A. 265) that had established it. Before doing so, how-
ever, the consent of the President of the United States was obtained, as re-
quired by the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. The circular stipulated that all
transactions in gold and foreign exchange must be licensed by the Central
a! Bank and all receipts of foreign exchange must be sold to the Bank. On De-
cember 29, the Central Bank also raised its rediscount rate from the very low
rate of 1.5 per cent to 3.0 per cent.'5
• Thus, the immediate reason for the imposition of exchange controls was
an exchange crisis touched off by liberal spending and credit policies related
to the 1949 election. However, more basic reasons for the underlying weak-
U
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ness in the country's balance-of-payments conditions were pent-up demand
for both consumption and capital goods coupled with an unrealistically low
price for foreign exchange.
Tax Exemption and Special Financing Facilities.
Although the promotion of domestic industrial development does not
appear to have been the main purpose of the early import controls, the gov-
ernment, soon after gaining its independence, did utilize special tax and financ-
ing privileges for the specific purpose of fostering "new and necessary" indus-
tries. The enabling act (R.A. 35, September 1946) exempted new industries
from all internal (but not import) taxes for a period of four years from the
time the industry was organized. While "new and necessary" industries were
not defined in the act, the Secretary of Finance in an implementing order
specified these industries to be ones that "had not been commercially exploited
in the Philippines before the war" and that "contribute to industrial and eco-
nomic development." The latter phrase was regarded by the Finance Secretary
as being general enough to cover a very wide variety of manufacturing activi-
ties. However, despite this broad interpretation and even though aliens as well
as Filipinos could enjoy the tax benefits, only one new manufacturing cor-
poration availed itself of the tax exemption as of March 1948.16 It was not
until import controls were introduced, in 1949, that the number of firms apply-
ing for the privilege became significant. This poor response to tax incentives
seems to have been due to the absence of tariffs on imports of manufactures
from the United States coupled with an abundance of U.S. aid and the profit-
ability of reconstructing previously established industries.17
Another governmental measure that should be mentioned as contributing
to the import-substitution efforts initiated in the reconstruction period was the -
1946act establishing the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC). This
organization, with an initial authorized capital of P300 million and lending
rates below those in the free market, became the major source of industrial
credit in the economy. In the 1947—49 period the RFC approved loans aver-
aging about $45 million annually. Real estate construction and repair ab-
sorbed 51 per cent of this sum (a share that rapidly decreased as war-damaged
buildings were repaired or replaced); the industrial sector, 28 per cent; and
agricultural activities and the government, the remaining 21 per cent.
1950-52: THE EARLY YEARS
OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
The exchange-control experience of the first few years of the 1950s is note-
worthy for two main reasons. First, after exchange controls were introduced
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by the Central Bank, in December 1949, government controls rapidly spread
to all types of international transactions and became increasingly complex.
Second, prices of imported goods increased sharply, in part because of the
Korean War, but mainly because of the restrictive import controls. The gov-
ernment responded to the price increases by adopting tax measures designed
to capture the windfall gains associated with exchange controls and also by
ot liberalizing import controls over the more essential consumer goods and raw
materials. As is shown in the statistical analysis of Chapter 5,itwas during
c- this period that the pattern—so typical in many developing nations—was
'is- firmly established of protecting commodities generally classified as luxury
es items compared to capital goods, essential raw materials, and basic consump-
tion goods. Table 2-2 summarizes the main policy changes in the 1950—52
re period.
er
The Nature of Import and Exchange Controls.
'7 RepublicAct 426, passed in May 1950, illustrates the growing corn-
. plexityof import controls. This law stipulated that import licenses issued by
the Import Control Board be required for all articles imported into the coun-
try. These imports were divided into four groups, depending upon their degree
- ofessentiality; and maximum and minimum percentage cuts from 1946—48
trade levels were established for each group. The first category, prime imports,
es consisted of items regarded as being of prime necessity and as not being in
sufficient supply locally.18 Quotas established for these goods were to reduce
the value of imports in the base period by no more than 40 per cent. The sec-
ond group, essential imports, consisted of articles that were regarded as neces-
sary (but not of prime necessity) for the health and well-being of the people.
Imports of these items were to be cut back so as to encourage their domestic
Iig production.'9 The legislated reduction on these imports was to be no less than
a! 40 per cent nor more than 60 per cent. Nonessential imports, the third cate-
r- gory, were defined as items "not necessary for the health and material well-
being of the people, but whose consumption is concomitant with the rise of
their standard of living." 20Thesewere to be cut between 60 and 80 per cent
id to encourage their domestic production in sufficient quantities to meet local
demand. Luxury imports, the last group, were categorized as articles primarily
"for ostentation or pleasure" and were to be reduced between 80 and 90 per
cent.2' The main items specifically not subject to import quota allocation un-
der the law were raw materials used in the manufacture of goods on the list
of so-called prime imports, supplies and equipment for the Philippine govern-
• ment, and books and supplies for schools and charitable organizations. More-
'le- over, agricultural equipment and "other machinery, materials, and equip-
• ment for dollar-producing, and dollar-saving industries" were excluded from
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TABLE2-2
Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1950—52
May 1950New Import Control Act requiring import licenses for all imports, stressing
the import-substitution objective, and giving preference to Filipino
citizens
June 1950Price controls instituted, covering essential consumer goods, raw mate-
rials, and machinery
Sept. 1950Increases in sales taxes, with greatest rise occurring in luxury consumer
items
Dec. 1950Issuance of Executive Order permitting certain highly essential consumer t
goods and raw materials to be imported without quota limitations in e
order to hold prices down
Feb. 1951Increases in base on which sales tax calculation is made for imported
goods; again, greatest increase occurred for luxury consumer goods
Mar. 1951Imposition of 17 per cent excise on peso value of foreign exchange
sold by banking system
May 1951Adoption of still another Import Control Act completely decontrolling
a number of essential consumer items but also extending import-substi-
tution goal by stating as an objective that nonessential commodity
imports be reduced or banned; re-export of certain essential goods also
banned
June 1951Further easing through an Executive Order of the importation of addi-
tional essential commodities in order to stem increase in domestic r
prices
Aug. 1951Retrenchment of liberalization policy by reducing number of decontrolled t
items and establishing list of banned items -
May1952Introduction of measures designed to make it more difficult to undervalue t
exports I
Aug. 1952Reduction of rediscount rate from 3 per cent to 2 per cent
the provision that items not enumerated in the control lists (about 55percent
of 1949 imports) would not be granted import licenses that resulted in im-
ports exceeding their 1948 levels.
The import-substituting objective was stated much more clearly in the
1950 act than in the Import Control Act of 1948. If the domestic production
of a commodity was deemed sufficient to meet local demand by the secretaries
of Agriculture and Commerce, the Import Control Board was required to im-
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pose the maximum percentage cut stipulated for the appropriate category to
which the item belonged. In addition to that, an uncontrolled item could be
moved into the list of controlled goods and a controlled item could be moved
= to a more restrictive category.
g Wecan see quite clearly at this early stage how the Philippines embarked
upon an industrialization policy directed not only at import-substitution ac-
tivities rather than export-promoting ones but also at the production of many
nonessential consumption commodities. Instead of attempting to remove ex-
change controls once the 1949 crisis had passed, policymakers decided to
continue to employ these controls to carry out their export-promoting and im-
port-replacing goals. With a simplistic view of economic interrelationships,
these leaders reasoned that the capital goods needed for an expansion of
export-oriented and basic import-replacing production would be more or less
automatically imported once imports of consumption goods were forcibly
curtailed. They also concluded that the most plausible criterion for restricting
these consumption imports was their degree of essentiality in terms of basic
nutritional and health needs. Thus, imports of so-called luxury items were
sharply curtailed. They had overlooked the tendency of capital to flow into
the most profitable industries and that the act of restricting imports of non-
essential consumption goods would raise the domestic prices of these goods
sharply and thereby make their production the most profitable opportunity
available. Imports of luxury goods were restricted so severely that the produc-
o tion incentives brought about by this act dominated all the other policies aimed
at encouraging the manufacturing sector.
Another important feature of the 1950 Import Control Act was the
marked preference it gave to Filipino citizens. The Import Control Board was
instructed to reserve 30 per cent of the total import quota for any article in
the fiscal year 1950—51, 40 per cent in 1951—52, and 50 per cent in 1952—
53 to new Filipino importers. At least 60 per cent of a company's stock had
-ae to be owned by Filipinos for a firm to qualify under this provision of the law.
Existing import businesses, which had long been dominated by Westerners
• and Chinese, received the remaining quota allocations.22
The granting of an import license by the Import Control Board auto-
matically entitled an importer to a foreign-exchange license. However, the
Monetary Board, which supervised exchange control, informed the Control
Board from time to time (apparently every six months) of the amount of for-
eign exchange available for any specified period for imports. Import licenses
were not to be issued in amounts that would exceed the available foreign-
exchange supply.
Besides cutting down on commodity imports, the Central Bank modestly
curtailed the amount of foreign exchange available for service transactions.23
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Controls were also imposed on the remittance of earnings of foreign corn- St
panics. Initially, the amount of income transferable could represent 10 per tu
cent of the foreign participation in the current net profits or capital stock as
of December 3 1, 1949, whichever was higher. In order to attract foreign cap- El
ital,this provision was relaxed, in May 1950, to permit the additional remit-
tance of earnings representing 30 per cent of the foreign participation in either
the fixed assets or capital stock of the whichever was higher.
The efforts of the Central Bank and Import Control Board to conserve
foreign exchange proved very successful, and imports declined 20 per cent
between 1949 and 1950. Furthermore, in line with the import-substitution
policy that began in earnest in 1950, the composition of imports shifted sig-
nificantly from consumption goods to raw materials and capital goods. Con-
sumption goods constituted 64 per cent of total imports in 1949 but only 50
per cent in 1950. As the analysis in Chapter 5 indicates, implicit protective er
rates of 200 per cent or more for nonessential consumer goods were not un-
usual in this period. The share of raw materials imports increased from 26 to or
38 per cent, and that of capital goods, from 10 to 12 per cent between the two
years. The success of the policy in actually stimulating domestic production
is indicated by the sharp rise in the net capital of firms granted tax exemptions
—from P2.7 million in 1949 to P8.6 million in 1950.24 The shift was also
aided by the moral suasion exerted on commercial banks by the Central Bank
to limit real estate and consumption loans and direct more of their credit op-
erations to production. s
Not only did imports drop in 1950, but starting in August exports rose ti
sharply due to increases in demand related to the Korean War. During the
year export prices rose 12 per cent, and the value of exports, 30 per cent. Con-
sequently, the current account balance shifted from a $68 million deficit in
1949 to a $189 million surplus in 1950, while reserves rose by $96 million. f
Controlling Price Increases and Windfall Gains.
A significant consequence of the tight import controls instituted in 1950
was upward pressure on the domestic prices of imported goods. These prices
rose 21 per cent from 1949 to 1950. To offset this pressure a price control bill S
(R.A. 509) was passed, in June 1950, which was intended "to prevent, locally c
or generally, scarcity, monopolization, and profiteering, from affecting the a
supply...ofboth imported and locally manufactured" goods for which P
price control was deemed in the public interest. The group of commodities d
covered reflected the government's concern for maintaining low prices for irli
basic consumer goods, machinery, and certain raw materials. Specifically, the
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stuffs, textiles, clothing, paper, school supplies, building materials, agricul-
tural and industrial machinery, and fuel and lubricants.
In still another attempt to hold prices down, President Quirino issued
Executive Order 388, in late December 1950, stipulating that certain "prime
commodities and raw materials in short supply in the Philippines" be im-
ported without quota allocation during the first quarter of 1951. In a new im-
port act, in May of 1951 (R.A. 650), these efforts were supplemented by
the establishment of a class of "completely decontrolled items" which in-
it cluded the items mentioned in previous executive orders and to which were
added a few more consumption articles. A second specified category, "essen-
tial items of import," consisted mainly of a long list of manufactured inter-
mediate commodities and capital goods. In budgeting for essential imports the
0 administering authorities were instructed to give priority to imports of machin-
ery and raw materials for essential industries and to the needs of government
agencies engaged in stockpiling essential goods and in stabilizing prices. Sec-
o ond priority was to be granted to the equipment and raw materials require-
o ments of bona fide producers of nonessentials to the extent that these require-
n ments could not be adequately met from local supplies. The balance of foreign
Is exchange available after meeting the first two priorities was distributed to
o businesses and bona fide importers in proportion to their 1949 import levels,
k including a reasonable allocation for new Filipino importers. No specific list
of nonessentials was appended to the act, but it was stated that an objective
should be to reduce or ban the importation of these latter types of commodi-
ties.
Two other anti-inflationary measures taken by the government in May
1951 were: (1) a lifting of the 80 per cent margin requirement introduced
n in 1949 for certain textile imports that had become important raw materials
1. for the industry, and (2) the banning of re-exports of such goods as ma-
chines, medicines, foodstuffs, oils and gasoline, and scrap metals (R.A. 613).
On the other hand, one conspicuously absent anti-inflationary policy was a
tight monetary policy.25 The money supply had expanded 19 per cent between
0 1949 and 1950, and in early 1951 credit still remained easy.26
These efforts to restrain the upward movement of prices were not very
II successful until the latter part of 1951, as the retail price indices for selected
y commodities shown in Table 2-3 indicate.27 With regard to the late 1950
and 1951 period, it is noted in the Central Bank Annual Report that "the ex-
h panded purchasing power due to inflated export earnings, heavy final war
damage payments, and deficit financing was being penned in by the stringent
import and exchange controls in force and was pushing prices up." 28 A rough
notion of the profitability in producing import-competing goods domestically
is indicated by the fact that, although the c.i.f. unit value of imported goods
4..-,• .
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in 1951 actually was less than in 1949, wholesale prices of imported goods in
1951 were 53 per cent above their 1949 level. Wholesale prices of locally
produced goods for home consumption rose less than 1 per cent between 1949
and 1951. This protective effect of import controls is analyzed in detail in
Chapter 5.
July 1950 Jan. 1951 July 1951 Dec. 1951
All items 102.7 113.0 122.2 117.2
Foodstuff 99.7 113.3 111.6 110.3
Wearing apparel 99.4 120.3 135.6 112.5
Construction materials 101.0 105.3 126.6 117.7
Fuel 106.5 103.8 110.6 110.6
Drugs and medicine 100.3 122.3 124.7 115.8
School supplies 117.0 102.6 155.4 142.1
Cigarettes and cigars 129.1 127.8 140.2 116.5
Liquor 108.8 119.7 151.2 121.4
Kitchen utensils 108.7 150.6 182.0 178.6
Starch and oils 124.5 148.7 141.0 143.0
Soap 92.3 113.1 97.7 92.3











SOURCE: Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1951, pp. 181—182. C(
The government was, however, successful in capturing some of the wind-
fall gains going to many importers. First, in September 1950, the sales tax on
both imported and domestically produced goods was raised. For jewelry,
medium-priced automobiles, and toilet preparations, the rate was raised from
30 per cent to 50 per cent (to 75 per cent in the case of high-priced automo-
biles); for lower-priced automobiles, sporting goods, refrigerators, radios,
phonographs, washing machines, firearms, etc., from 15 to 30 per cent; and
for all other articles, from 5 to 7 per cent. Next, in February 1951, the base
for calculating the sales tax on imported goods was increased to 200 per cent
of the c.i.f. value for the first group of items, 150 per cent for the second, and
125 per cent for all other imports. As the analysis in Chapter 5 indicates, in the
absence of these measures windfall gains of 100 percent or more would have
been obtained in 1951 from selling many imported nonessential goods. A
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in that, when exchange controls and such measures as special trade taxes and
ly margin requirements were finally lifted, in the 1960s, this measure remained
.9 in effect and, together with the tariff structure, still provided a high degree of
in protection to domestic industries producing nonessential consumer goods.
Besides raising the sales tax, the government in the fall of 1950 increased
the rate of taxation on personal and corporate income. The rate on corporate
income, for example, was increased from 12 per cent to 16 per cent. In 1951
the corporate rate was again raised so that the tax level on incomes below
P100,000 became 20 per cent. Direct taxes, however, still remained a rela-
tively unimportant source of government tax revenue. Their 1950 share of
total tax revenue was only about 17 per cent.
1 These actions were followed, in late March 1951, by the imposition of a
— 17per cent excise tax on the peso value of foreign exchange sold by the Cen-
tral Bank or commercial banks (R.A. 601). This measure had been recom-
mended, mainly for the purpose of raising revenue and reducing imports, by
the Bell Mission, an economic survey group sent from the United States, at
President Quirino's request.29 However, because domestic prices were already
considerably above c.i.f. prices for tightly controlled items, the tax had the ap-
parent initial effect of capturing windfall gains rather than cutting imports.3°
Upward price pressure on essential items subject to a liberal control policy was
prevented by forgoing or refunding the tax on such items.3' Furthermore, the
tax was not levied at all on foreign exchange used to purchase machines and
raw materials by the "new and necessary" industries covered by R.A.
InJune 1951 the President further expanded the list of items exempted
— fromquota allocation in order "to arrest the rising trend of prices and dis-
courage speculation." Under Executive Order 446 the Price Stabilization Cor-
poration was authorized to import some 150 specifically mentioned items "in
such quantities as may be found necessary." The list included not only basic
d- consumer goods but the main raw materials and capital goods used by the in-
dustrial and agricultural sectors.
The policy of attempting to hold down prices by liberalizing the coun-
rn try's import policy began to conflict with the objective of stimulating import-
substituting production through protection. It was claimed, for example, that
the easing of controls led to excessive stockpiling and a glut of certain im-
ad ported goods to the detriment of local production.33 Consequently, in August
Lse 1951, the President instituted a retrenchment in his liberalization policy (Ex-
ecutive Order 471). As already noted, the import legislation passed in May
nd had directed the control authorities to "reduce or ban" both nonessentials and
he commodities produced "economically and in sufficient quantities" domestically,
ye but Executive Order 471 went a step further in actually setting out a schedule
4
A for banning such imports. Almost 150 items were to be banned immediately
iS and another 20 by July 1952. The number of completely decontrolled items
4 4
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was also reduced from 19 to 6. Nevertheless, the government did succeed in
halting the rise in the retail prices of imported goods. As is indicated in i
Table 2-3, the index of retail prices fell from a high of 122 in July 1951 (Jan- b
uary 1950 =100)to 117 in December 1951. The money supply actually de-
dined 5percent during the year as the government fought the inflation by
liberalizing imports. However, the balance-of-trade deficit rose from $5 mu-
lion in 1950 to $76 million in 1951.
No significant changes in economic policy occurred in 1952. Although
some steps were taken to make it more difficult to undervalue exports, imports c
continued to be closely regulated by means of import and exchange controls,
while such measures as the 80 per cent margin requirement on letters of credit
for the importation of specified luxury and nonessential items and the 17 per a
cent tax on foreign exchange further discouraged imports. However, the Cen-
tral Bank did lower the rediscount rate from 3 per cent to 2 per cent in Au-
gust 1952. Retail prices continued the decline begun in mid-1951, and the
trade account deficit remained at about its 1951 level.
1953-59: FURTHER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 4
The year 1953 is an important one in any survey of Philippine experience
with trade controls because the Congress, in response to continued charges of b
favoritism and excessive delays on the part of the authorities administering P
import controls,34 failed to extend the Import Control Act when it expired in
June of that year. The Executive branch responded by placing the entire con-
trol mechanism in the hands of the Central Bank. This shift reduced the num- 11
ber of charges of favoritism and excess delays in the allocation of foreign ex-
change but did not change the general goal of import substitution. This ob-
jective was vigorously pursued by the Central Bank and other agencies
throughout the rest of the l950s. By 1959 protective rates of 400 per cent or
more were not uncommon in the category of nonessential consumer goods. C
Besides holding to the belief that exchange controls were helpful in fostering it
industrialization and to the policy of providing low-priced essential consumer
goods for lower-income groups, Central Bank authorities found exchange con-
trols desirable from the viewpoint of their responsibilities "to maintain mone- c
tary stability" and "to preserve the international value of the peso." Fear of
inflation and a resulting exchange crisis and depreciation should controls be
removed was frequently expressed by these authorities during the 1950s. How-
ever, there were growing pressures from exporters to be permitted to trade
at a more favorable exchange rate. They pointed out that the overvaluation
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in of the peso acted to discourage production for export, purposes. Finally, in
in 1955a"no-dollar import law" was passed that enabled certain exports to be
bartered for imports outside of the exchange system.35 Largely because of this
le- law, the second phase of the Bhagwati-Krueger schema, namely, the adoption
by of ad hoc measures to offset some of the unfavorable aspects of exchange con-
trol, is dated as beginning in 1955.
In this section, trade and related policies during the entire 1953—59 pe-
gh nod are described in five broad areas of special interest: operation of exchange
controls by the Central Bank; monetary and fiscal measures; changes in tariffs;
1s, tax exemptions for new firms; and finally, measures designed to increase cx-
dit ports. Table 2-4 contains summaries of the major trade-related measures
adopted during the period.
'U-
'he Operation of Exchange Controls by the Central Bank.
Major policy actions of the Central Bank were decided by a seven-
member Monetary Board. The Secretary of Finance was the presiding officer,
while the other ex-officio members were the governor of the Central Bank,
the president of the government-owned Philippine National Bank, and the
chairman of the Development Bank of the Philippines. In addition, three mem-
bers were selected for six-year terms from the general public.36
ice Circular 44, issued on June 12, 1953, set forth the guiding principles to
of be followed by the Central Bank in the licensing of foreign exchange for the
Lng payment of imports. For each six-month period the Central Bank specified
in not only the total amount of foreign exchange available to each commercial
bank, but also the sums available by commodity category and by importers.
The year 1952 was established as the base for allocating foreign exchange
among importers, but a contingency reserve was also set up to meet the ex-
)b- pansion needs of existing producers, the requirements of new producers for
ies machinery and raw materials, the adjustments of quotas for existing importers,
or and the foreign-exchange requests of new importers. Only Filipino merchants
ds. could qualify as new importers. The commodity breakdown, covering 1,865
ing items, consisted of:
)fl- 1. Highly essential commodities (30 items), composed chiefly of medi-
cal and pharmaceutical products and dairy products.
of 2. Essential producer goods (560 items), including particularly most
be machinery, some transport equipment and professional and scientific instru-
•tw- ments, most chemical elements and compounds, fertilizers, minerals and base
metals, fuels and lubricants, and selected yarns and fabrics.
'jion 3. Nonessential producer goods (162 items), comprising hides and
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TABLE 2-4
Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1953—59 it
June 1953Expiration of 1951 Import Control Act and placing of entire import- a
control mechanism under control of Central Bank
Enactment of new tax exemption law for "new and necessary" industries, a
covering import taxes as well as internal taxes 1
Oct. 1953Repeal of 80 per cent cash-deposit requirement for specified luxury and
nonessential items
Jan. 1954Reduction of rediscount rate from 2 per cent to 1 1/2 per cent
Sept. 1955Revision of United States—Philippines Trade Agreement which included
accelerating rate at which Philippine duties would be levied on imports
from the United States and eliminating statutory U.S. influence over e
management of foreign-exchange matters t
Replacement of 17 per cent excise tax on foreign exchange by gradually ti
declining (1.7 percentage points per annum) tax on imports s
Enactment of "no-dollar import law" permitting certain exports to be
bartered for imports outside of exchange system (
1957 Tightening of monetary policies by means of two-step (March and Sep.
tember) rise in rediscount rate to 41/2per cent, establishment of
ceilings on various categories of loans, and reintroduction in September
and December of differential cash-deposit requirements on letters of P
credit for importation of various types of goods g
June 1957Introduction of new tariff schedule providing for low rates on essential
consumer and producer goods and high rates on items classified as
nonessential g
a
Feb. 1958Easing of cash-deposit requirements on letters of credit
Feb. 1959Further tightening of monetary controls by increasing rediscount rate to q
• 6½ per cent (but establishing lower preferential rates for crop loans p
and export bills) and raising reserve requirement against demand Ii
• deposits
July 1959Imposition of 25 per cent margin fee levied by Central Bank on sales of d
foreign exchange s
skins, essential oils and perfume materials, and selected animal and vegetable
oils, chemicals and yarns, fabrics and other materials.
4. Essential consumer goods (125 items), including certain medical
preparations, some foods, and selected items of machinery and transport, heat-
• ing and lighting equipment.
•1
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- 5.Nonessential consumer goods (460 items), including most fruits and
vegetables, most beverages and tobacco products, toilet preparations, most
leather goods, and many other consumer manufactures.
6. Unclassified goods (528 items), embracing numerous raw materials
and a wide variety of manufactures (e.g., clothing, furniture, wood and cork
manufactures) deemed to be produced locally in sufficient quantity and of
es acceptable quality to meet home demand and offered at competitive prices.
The importation of items placed in this category was virtually banned, since
specific authorization of the Central Bank was required to bring them into the
nd country.
ed This essentiality classification remained until 1957 when in accordance
rts with a resolution of the National Economic Council two new groups, semi-
'er essential producer goods and semiessential consumer goods, were added, and
• the highly essential class was replaced by a list of decontrolled items. At this
Ily time, the three consumer classes were defined as follows: (1) essential con-
sumer goods—basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, health, and education
be for low-income families defined as not earning more than $60 per month;
(2) semiessential consumer goods—consisting of nonbasic goods for fam-
ilies with earnings of $60—$150 per month; and (3) nonessential consumer
goods—luxury items for families earning over $150 per month. On the pro-
ducer side the specification of the items to be included was: (1) essential
of producer goods—requirements of industries producing essential consumer
goods, export goods, essential and semiessential producer goods and services
1 including raw materials, and essential utility services; (2) semiessential pro-
ducer goods—requirements of industries producing semiessential consumer
goods, certain exports, and semiessential and nonessential producer goods;
and (3) nonessential producer goods—requirements of industries producing
• nonessential consumer goods. In the allocation of foreign exchange an "ade-
to quate" supply was to be made available for imports of essential consumer and
•nS
• producergoods; a "limited" supply for semiessential producer goods; a "more
nd limited" supply for semiessential consumer and nonessential producer goods,
which was to be made available only after the requests for semiessential pro-
of ducer items were satisfied; and a "very limited" supply for nonessential con-
sumer items. The 1957 resolution also reaffirmed a policy already in effect
— in namely, that notwithstanding these priorities, "foreign exchange
)le shall be made available only to the extent that the commodity proposed to be
imported or any suitable substitute is not produced locally."
The main effect of placing all import control operations within the Cen-
tral Bank was to improve the administrative efficiency of these activities rather
than bring about any fundamental change in policy direction. In particular,34EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
import-substitutingactivitieswerevigorouslyandconsistentlypursued
throughout the rest of the 1950s. As is noted in the 1954 Annual Report of
the Central Bank, this was done by the "virtual decontrol of raw materials
and machinery and the curtailment of foreign exchange allocations for com-
modities produced locally in sufficient quantities." At the same time controls
on highly essential foods and medicines were eased, with the result that by
1957 all of these items were decontrolled and thus could be imported in un-
limited quantities.38
Number of Items Shifted from One Import Classification
to Another Between 1953 and 1958
To
From




















































NOTE: Categories are arranged from left to right and from top to bottom in roughly
descending order of priority for allocation of foreign exchange for imports.
SOURCE: Central Bank of the Philippines.
1
These points are brought out in Table 2-5, in which are shown the
changes made in the classification of goods between 1953 and December
1958. In the consumer goods classes, for example, 52 of the 190 shifts moved
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ed imports. Articles so affected included writing ink, typewriter ribbons, sau-
of sages, roasted coffee, smoking tobacco, waxes and polishes, knitted fabrics,
j
blankets,carpets, incandescent lamps, automobiles, cotton gloves, and lead
pencils. At the same time such basic items as canned milk, canned fish, wheat
)ls flour, corned beef, and antibiotics (in bulk) were completely decontrolled.
by It also appears from the table that the exchange authorities must have sought
to encourage the domestic production of many simply processed intermediate
producer goods, since a large number of items were transferred to the semi-
essential producer category. The growing emphasis on reducing imports of
both consumption goods and nonessential producer goods in favor of essential
producer goods is further brought out in Table 2-6, which contains the per-
centage distribution of import values on the basis of the 1957 exchange-con-
trol classification system. Between 1954 and 1959 imports of essential pro-
— ducergoods rose from 40 to 61 per cent of all imports.
— Asthe above descriptions of the 1953 and 1957 exchange-control classes
— indicate,the criteria for allocating foreign exchange among commodity cate-
gories remained essentially unchanged throughout the 1950s. Consumption
— commoditiesregarded as necessary to maintain adequate nutritional and
health levels for the population were imported very freely, whereas corn-
modities considered to be nonessential luxury items were admitted very spar-
ingly. The key change in the 1957 classification system was that it determined
the difficult question of just how one should grade consumption goods by de-
gree of essentiality on the basis of observed consumption patterns by level of
income, in the 1957 system also, the goal was to direct a larger share of
producer goods imports into the production of the more essential consumer
and producer goods categories and of exports. However, in the 1953 and
1957 classifications, the practice was continued of virtually banning imports
— ofan item that exchange-control authorities thought could be produced com-
petitively within the country. The fundamental point to be made about the
exchange-control system, however, is that its continued effect was to encour-
age the domestic production of the very items regarded as nonessential by the
authorities.
Another feature of the operation of exchange controls during this period
was the increasing Filipinization of the import trade. Between 1948 and 1958,
the value of imports traded by Filipinos rose from 23 per cent to 54 per cent.
The import share of American importers only declined from 28 per cent to 24
per cent between these years, but the share attributable to Chinese traders
he fell from 39 per cent to 14 per However, part of the trade classified
er as being undertaken by Filipino importers was in fact carried out by regular,
non-Filipino importers. New Filipino importers sold their import licenses to
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Monetary and Fiscal Policies.
The same year (1953) in which the Central Bank assumed full authority
for quantitatively controlling imports was also an election year. The Central
Bank responded to the consequent pressures for easy exchange-control and
credit policies by repealing the 80 per cent cash-deposit requirement for im-
ports of specified luxury and nonessential items and by reducing the required
ratio of net foreign-exchange holdings, cash in bank vaults, excess reserves,
etc., to letters of credit from 70 to 50 per cent. Furthermore, government
spending was significantly increased, and the internal government debt rose
45 per cent.
These expansionary policies were continued after the election of Presi-
dent Ramon Magsaysay, who immediately recommended that a truly inte-
grated development program be planned and put into effect by the National
Economic Council.4' In order to finance the governmental portion of the re-
sulting plan, the Congress authorized the President to borrow up to P1 billion.
As part of the general expansionary program, the rediscount rate was lowered
in January 1954 from 2 per cent to 1½ per cent per year. Since the capacity
of the private sector to absorb government bonds was slight, most of the
newly issued government debt ended up in the hands of the Central Bank.
For example, in 1954—55 the expenditures of the government for development
purposes totaled P331 million, of which P250 million was borrowed from the
banking system. In 1955—56 and 1956—57 development expenditures42 were
P467 million and P488 million, with borrowings of P152 million and P129
million, respectively.43 The money supply increased at an average annual rate
of 9.2 per cent from 1954 to 1957. However, real GNP rose at an average
annual rate of 6.7 per cent between these years, and the wholesale price index
increased at an average yearly rate of only 1.6 per cent.
Central Bank authorities were, however, concerned about the potential
inflationary effect of the monetary and expenditure expansion and did succeed
in obtaining a credit tightening in 1957. The rediscount rate was raised from
1½ to 2 per cent in March and to 4½ per cent in September. The rate of in-
terest paid on savings deposits was also raised from 2 per cent to 3 per cent in
September. Furthermore, in April 1957 the Central Bank adopted a system of
priorities on credits to commercial banks and imposed ceilings on the various
categories established.44 But it was not until after the presidential election,
in November, that the pressures on the trade balance could be eased by sig-
nificantly tightening import controls. The deficit on the trade account reached
$182 million, the highest since 1949.
The main restraining measure adopted was the reintroduction of margin
requirements on letters of credit, in September of 1957. A cash deposit of 100
per cent was required for imports of goods classified as nonessential. In De-38EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
cember, imports of decontrolled items, essential consumer and producer
goods, and semiessential producer goods were also made subject to the 100
per cent margin requirement, and imports of semiessential consumer and non-
essential producer goods, to a 200 per cent margin requirement. Also at that
time the opening of letters of credit for nonessential consumer goods, includ-
ing those purchased through barter, was prohibited.45
As the balance of payments quickly improved, most of these measures
were relaxed. In February 1958, margin requirements were lifted for imports
of decontrolled items and for imports by essential and semiessential pro-
ducers. In October the margin requirement was reduced from 200 per cent
to 100 per cent for semiessential consumer goods and nonessential producer
goods. In early 1959, imports of nonessential consumer goods were permitted,
first only on a barter basis and then on a normal payment basis. However, a
100 per cent margin requirement was established for such imports.
At the same time that the Central Bank moved to ease its very stringent
import controls, it also took various actions to curtail excess demand and
reduce windfalls. The rediscount rate was raised in February 1959 from 4½
per cent to 6½ per cent with preferential rates of 4½ per cent given to agri-
cultural crop loans and 5 per cent on export bills. In addition, the reserve re-
quirement against demand deposits was raised in stages from 18 per cent to
21 per cent. Most important, however, was the imposition in July 1959, under
R.A. 2609, of a 25 per cent "margin fee" levied by the Central Bank on sales
of foreign exchange. The fee was not a tax in that it accrued to the Central
Bank rather than the government. The level of this fee was reduced to 20
per cent in November 1960, 15 per cent in March 1961, and finally abolished
in January 1962, though, as we shall see in the next chapter, its place was
taken by other measures of depreciation.
The 25 per cent levy on foreign exchange was designed not merely to
curtail the excess demand problem of the period but also to serve as a signifi-
cant but uniform cushioning measure for the exchange decontrol that the gov-
ernment had finally decided to undertake.4° Toward this end, by the act estab-
lishing the margin fee, the Central Bank was permitted to set the rate as high
as 40 per cent, with the stipulation that application of the rate must be uni-
form. There were a number of exemptions from the fee, e.g., drugs and medi-
cines, medical and hospital supplies, canned milk, and fertilizers, but signifi-
cantly they did not include "new and necessary" industries. This move away
from preferential treatment for these industries as well as other long-favored
groups was further extended by two other laws, approved in June 1959 (R.A.
2351 and R.A. 2352), that eliminated the exemptions of "new and necessary"
industries from the special import tax in force since 1955 as well as from the
income tax.
As the preceding description indicates, during the 1950s (and also the
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1960s) the government did not hesitate to employ deficit spending and easy
credit policies either to improve the re-election probabilities of the party in
power or to implement a particular development program. Consequently, the
Central Bank alternately pursued liberal and restrictive monetary policies. At
• the outset of a new administration, for example, it would be required to pro-
vide credit on a liberal basis in order to stimulate economic growth. However,
when this overly liberal monetary policy resulted in strong inflationary pres-
sures as well as serious balance-of-payments problems, the Central Bank
- wouldattempt to solve these problems by quickly applying such restrictive
monetary policies as higher rediscount rates and cash-deposit requirements
for letters of credit.
I Increases in Tariff Levels.
As the expiration date (1954) for the period of mutual free trade under
I the U.S.-Philippine Trade Agreement of 1946 approached, the Philippine gov-
ernment requested a re-examination and adjustment of various provisions of
- theagreement. The agreement was widely criticized in the Philippines on the
- groundsthat it prevented the Philippines from exercising control over its own
exchange rate, resulted in a sizable loss of potential tariff revenue, and granted
the country a considerably smaller margin of preference in U.S. markets than
initially because of subsequent U.S. tariff cuts. The result of the ensuing nego-
tiations—and after the free trade period had been extended to the end of
1955—was the Revised Trade Agreement, better known as the Laurel-Langley
Agreement. This new agreement accelerated the rate at which imports from
the United States would be subject to the full amount of Philippine tariffs,
while slowing down the initial rise in the application of U.S. tariffs to imports
from the Philippines. Specifically, the percentage of each country's tariff rates
applicable to imports from the other was set as follows (in place of the annual
increases of five percentage points under the 1946 agreement):
Philippine Imports U.S. Imports
• from the fromthe
- Period United States Philippines
1956—58 25% 5%
1959—61 50 10




After 1973 100 100
• Besides these tariff changes, the absolute quota imposed by the United
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Stateson rice was dropped, and those on cigars and scrap tobacco, coconut
oil, and pearl buttons were turned into tariff quotas. The sugar and cordage
quotas were retained, but the United States agreed that additional sugar
quotas, when these became necessary, would be extended to the Philippines.47
In return for these various concessions, the Philippines agreed to replace the
17 per cent excise tax on foreign-exchange sales with a 17 per cent tax on 4
importsthat was reduced 10 per cent i.e., 1.7 percentage points, each year
from 1957 on. This change represented an important concession to American
investors as well as shipping and insurance companies.
In addition to accelerating the rate at which the full height of Philippine
tariffs would be attained against U.S. imports, the government also took steps
to raise the level of these duties. The tariff schedule that went into effect after
the war was essentially that which had prevailed since 1909. This schedule
had been constructed mainly with revenue considerations in mind and was
aimed at an ad valorem tariff level of about 23 per cent on dutiable imports
from countries other than the United States. Since it was felt that this tariff
schedule did not encourage the kind of industrialization sought by the govern-
ment, a Tariff Commission was created, in 1953 (R.A. 911), and charged
with making a thorough study of the duty structure. The Laurel-Langley
Agreement went into effect before the Philippine Congress could agree on a
new set of tariffs; so the President raised duties by executive order as of Jan-
uary 1, 1956.48 However, a new tariff code finally was agreed upon and went
into effect in June 1957. Under the new law not only were duty rates changed,
but the President was given the authority to raise tariffs up to 400 per cent of
their new levels or lower them by 50 per cent after an investigation by the
Tariff Commission. c
Under the 1957 act, duties were lowered on essential consumer goods
(e.g., canned milk) and on essential raw materials and producer goods (e.g.,
tractor fuels and machinery) that were not likely to be produced in adequate g
supply domestically in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, they were
raised on nonessentials and goods for which import-substitution possibilities u
were regarded as favorable (e.g., textile products and paper and paperboard te
manufactures). Valdepeñas calculated the following 1957 nominal tariff c
averages for a sample of 111 commodities classified by the essentiality cate-
gories of the Central Bank: highly essential goods, 15 per cent; essential con-
sumer goods, 18 per cent; nonessential consumer goods, 51 per cent; essential
producer goods, 25 per cent; nonessential producer goods, 30 per cent.49 The
distribution of dutiable items by tariff levels is shown in Table 2-7 for the
1949 and 1957 tariff schedules as well as for the rates prevailing in 1970. As
this table shows, a number of duties were lowered in 1957, but so, too, were a
number raised. On balance the simple average of duties rose from 23 per cent
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TABLE 2-7
S
Distribution of Ad Valorem Duties, 1949, 1957, 1970
Percentage Range of
Ad Valorem Rates
Percentage of Dutiable Itemsa
1949 1957 1970
0—5.0 1.0 1.8 1.8
5.1—10.0 12.5 29.9 26.8
10.1—15.0 18.1 9.8 9.3
15.1—20.0 • 13.8 8.2 8.0
20.1—25.0 21.0 8.7 7.6
25.1—30.0 11.2 3.1 4.0
30.1—40.0 13.5 7.1 7.3
40.1—50.0 5.6 6.8 7.5
50.1—60.0 2.0 4.3 5.7
60.1—90.0 1.0 8.0 9.5







Mean rate 22.8 36.2 37.7
SouRcE: Philippine Tariff Commission.
a. In 1949, the ad valorem schedule included only about 300 items; by 1957 and 1970,
the number had risen to about 1,200.
commodity categories from 1949 to 1957 brings out that for such simple man-
ufactures as textiles and prepared foodstuffs tariffs were sharply increased,
whereas for raw materials groups, such as chemicals, or capital goods cate-
gories, such as mechanical and electrical equipment, they were reduced on
many items. The following description of the tariff structure, taken from a doc-
ument prepared by the Tariff Commission, aptly describes not only the pat-
tern of tariff protection, but also the protection pattern afforded by the ex-
change-control system of the 1950s.
The height of duties, however, for different classes of products varies
according to several factors, namely, essentiality of the articles, avail-
ability of the articles locally and comparability quality-wise of domes-
tically produced articles with the imported. Essential articles may be
either consumer or producer goods. Non-essentials include luxuries and
articles normally consumed by the high-income consumers. On the basis
of these factors, the structure of the Philippine tariff may be broadly
described as follows:42EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
1. Low rates are provided for essential consumer goods and essential
producer goods which are not produced locally in sufficient quan-
tity and of the desired quality:
a) The essential consumer goods in this category consist of prod-
ucts which are consumed by the general mass of the people and
necessary for their health and well-being.
b) Essential producer goods include raw materials and intermedi-
ate goods used in the manufacture of locally made articles.
Machineries, equipment and supplies used in domestic produc-
tion also belong to the category of essential producer goods.
2. On the other hand, high rates of duty are imposed on luxuries
and non-essential articles.
3. Protective duties are levied on articles produced locally in substan- d tial quantity and acceptable quality. The Fevel of the duty is consid-
ered according to the nature of the protected article, the produc-
ai
tion capacity of the local industry to meet the domestic demand,
cost equalization, labor, raw materials, capitalization and other
economic factors.5°
When the 1957 Tariff Act was put into effect its main impact was to
capture for the government a greater share of the windfall gains associated
with the quantitative limitation of many imports through exchange controls.
However, as is brought out in Chapter 5, when exchange controls were dis-
mantled, in the early 1960s, and tariffs became effective constraints on import
prices, the pattern of low duties on basic consumer goods, raw materials, and
capital goods and high rates on luxuries and other nonessential goods contin-
ued to provide the same general structure of protection as existed under ex-
change controls.
Tax and Financial Assistance to Industry.
The policy of import substitution was further strengthened in the early
1950s by the enactment in 1953 of a new tax exemption law (R.A. 901) for
"new and necessary" industries. The new law covered not only internal taxes
but, unlike the 1946 law, it also covered external taxes (i.e., import duties,
the sales tax, and the 17 per cent excise tax on foreign exchange). The extent
of the tax exemption was 100 per cent through 1958, 90 per cent in 1959, 75
per cent in 1960, 50 per cent in 1961, and 10 per cent in 1962, after which
the privilege expired. Not only did firms covered by the old act automatically
receive the new benefits, but also firms whose exemption period had expired
could apply anew for the privileges. The qualifications for "new" and "neces-
sary" industries were similar to those of the previous law. A "new" industry
was one not in existence on a commercial basis before January 1, 1945, and
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ment of a stable and balanced national economy,"(2) "operate in corn-
formity with up-to-date practices" and give promise of "a reasonable degree
of permanency," and (3) use imported raw materials that "do not exceed 60
percent of manufacturing cost plus reasonable selling and administrative ex-
penses." Under the previous law a 50 per cent import-component ceiling had
been imposed for raw materials.52 During the six years (1953—58) when the
exemption rate was 100 per cent, the tax exemption law of 1953 resulted in
tax savings equivalent to 12.1 per cent of the annual sales of the firms in-
volved.53 This figure gradually decreased thereafter, e.g., to 9.1 per cent in
1960, until firms were liable to the full tax rate in 1963.
As already noted, the early response to the 1946 tax exemption law was
• disappointing; and it was not until tight import controls began, in 1950, that
- anysignificant number of entrepreneurs took advantage of the law. In 1950,
- 13firms were granted tax exemptions, and by 1952, the number had risen to
48. After the revisions in 1953, the number rose to 321 in 1955 and 900 in
r 1958. The output of these 900 firms was P650 million, or 21 per cent of the
gross output of all manufacturing firms in The commodity distribution
tas to of the tax-exempt firms as of 1957 is shown in Table 2-8. It can be seen that
ciated the assistance provided under the tax-exemption program up to that date




;ontin- Tax-exempt Industries in the Philippines Classified by




Nonessential producers 49 6.3
Semiessential producers 118 16.1
Essential producers 228 29.5
Nonessential consumers 268 34.7
Semiessentiat consumers 29 3.1
Essential consumers 78 10.1
Decontrolled 2 0.2
Total 772 100.0
SouRcE: JackHelter and Kenneth M. Kauffman, Tax incentives
for Industry in Less DevelopedCountries (Cambridge:Harvard Law
School, 1963), Table VI, p. 121, as reported in 0. P. Sicat, "Industrial
Policy and the Development of Manufacturing in the Philippines"
(University of the Philippines, School of Economics, Institute of
Economic Development and Research, Discussion Paper 65-I,
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Stillanother impetus to economic development duringthisperiod im
stemmed from the easy long-term credit policies of various Philippine and
international financing organizations. The Rehabilitation Finance Corpora-
tion (RFC),55 for example, made loans totaling $788 million (P1,576 mu- of
lion) between 1947 and 1957, of which 55 per cent went to agriculture, 19 th
per cent to industry, 23 per cent for real estate construction and repair, 2 per Pr
cent for self-liquidating government projects, and 1 per cent for miscellaneous
purposes.56 The lending rate of the RFC was about 2 per cent below that pre- eli
vailing in private markets. pr
Economic assistance from the United States and Japan also furthered mel
the development and import-substitution goals of the Philippines. During the m
1946—52 period American aid amounted to $777 million—$670 million in er
grants and $107 million in loans.57 This early aid was used mainly for re-
building and to meet urgent needs for consumption goods. Between 1953 and cx
1965 the aid figure came to $333 million, of which $260 million represented m
grants and $73 million, loans.58 In allocating aid in this period, greater em-
phasis was placed on the industrialization goals of the country.59 One-quarter pe4
of the aid went for industrial purposes. Other uses of this assistance were: fo4
food relief, 16 per cent; communications, 10 per cent; health and education,
12 per cent; community development, public administration, and miscellane-
ous purposes, 10 per cent. The government of Japan agreed in 1956 to make
reparations to the Philippines equivalent to $550 million in capital goods,
services, and cash over a twenty-year period. By April 1965 the sum received ri
was $144 million. The main recipients were the shipping industry, the rail- of




Few specific measures were taken in the 1950s to stimulate exports, and p
it was the pressure of traditional exporters that played a large role in finally E
bringing about the devaluations of the early 1960s. As is shown in Chapter 5, p
during the 1950s exporters suffered a significant decline in domestic purchas- m
ing power. The main policy taken to offset in part the penalty on exporters fr
of an overvalued exchange rate was the enactment of the so-called No-Dollar B
Import Law of 1955 (R.A. 1410). Under this law, certain exports could be
bartered for imports outside the exchange control system. The first set of
rules limited barter transactions to "minor" exports, to any excess over the
U.S. quotas for goods covered by the trade agreement between the two coun-
tries, and to any excess over the preceding five-year export average for all —.
othergoods. Presumably, the effective exchange rate for these barter transac- 19
tions was at about the black-market exchange rate of P3 per dollar. Permitted
.. ..1953—59: FURTHEREFFORTS TO PROMOTE IMPORT SUBSTITUTION45
lod imports were mainly restricted to producer goods and essential raw materials.
tnd In1957 barter exports amounted to 10 per cent of total exports. After con-
ra- siderable oscillation in the rules covering allowable transactions and because
of the strong opposition both of protected importers and the Central Bank,
19 the law was repealed in 1959. However, a new law (R.A. 2261), An Act to
per Promote Economic Development by Giving Incentives to Marginal and Sub-
MIS marginal Industries, was passed in its place and specified a list of items as
re- eligible for barter trade (subject to the conditions that they could not be sold
profitably for dollars and were in adequate supply to meet local require-
red ments) .°'Inaddition, the National Economic Council was directed to recom-
the mend annually to the Congress any additional industries that should be coy-
in ered by the act.
re- Gold producers, who had accounted for about one-quarter of Philippine
nd exports in the prewar period, were another group accorded preferential treat-
:ed ment under the exchange-control system. The details of the country's gold
m- policy varied during the period, but its main features were a direct subsidy and
ter permission to sell a portion of production in the higher-priced free market
re: for gold rather than to the Central Bank. As Golay points out, in the years
1949—57, over 80 per cent of the country's production was sold on the free
I-
market.62Its average price was about $55 per ounce of gold rather than the
ke official price of $35 an ounce.
Undervaluation of exports was a persistent problem throughout the pe-
•ed nod of tight exchange control as Philippine citizens used exports as a means
til- of attempting to transfer funds abroad in expectation of a devaluation, to cir-
nd cumvent the limitation on funds available for foreign travel, or to diversify
their foreign investment portfolios. Consequently, the export licensing system
established as part of the exchange-control system was gradually tightened
and made more elaborate. Exporters were eventually required to submit de-
tailed evidence as to the quantity and kind or grade of the commodity ex-
nd ported, which was then authenticated at the port of discharge. Officials in the
Ily Export Department also undertook a thorough analysis of the proposed ex-
5, port prices before granting an export license. Despite these efforts, it was esti-
mated by the Central Bank itself that at least 10 per cent of the dollar receipts





1. Paul V. McNutt, United States High Commissioner to [the] Philippine Islands—
—Final Report, U.S. Congress, House Document, vol. IX (389), 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
'Fed
1947, PP. 20—21.
2. Central Bank of the Philippines, Second Annual Report, 1950, p. 15.
S
-5946EXCHANGECONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
3.In 1945thecountry's exports amounted to less than $1 million and its imports
to $29 million. See R. Garcia, "Exchange Rate Policy in the Philippines," CentralBank
News Letter, July26, 1966. of
4. See Philippine Economic Survey Mission RevisedPhilippine Economic Develop- to 1
ment Program (1950; dittoed). was
5.Theagreement also stipulated that Philippine exports of sugar, cordage, rice, situ
cigars, scrap tobacco, coconut oil, and buttons of pearl shell were to be subject to ab- exp
solute quotas in the U.S. market throughout the entire period of the agreement. Sou
6. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philip- sidi
pines, Article V, U.S. Department of State,Treatiesand Other international Acts, per
Series 1588 (not dated). app
7. Frank H. Golay, ThePhilippines: Public Policy and National Economic Devel-
opment (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 64. This U.S. legislation provided
the Philippines with $620 million for war damages. of I
8.Still another attempt to increase the supplies of essential goods available for do-
mestic purchasers was the imposition of export controls through Executive Order 192 in
December 1948. This restricted the exportation of vital foodstuffs, important industrial Cei
goods, and a few construction materials. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines cot
declared the order null and void because it violated the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. cen
9. Examples of items included on this list were beer, wines, whiskey, automobiles,
perfumes and other toilet preparations, toys; wool, silk and synthetic woven fabrics
and ready-made wearing apparel, radios, boots and shoes, cigarettes, and fresh fruitS
10. Vicente B. Valdepeñas, Jr., TheProtection and Development of Philippine
Manufacturing (Manila:Ateneo University Press, 1970), Table 4.2, P. 56.
11. This relationship is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6. mei
12. Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., Problemsof Economic Development (The Philippines— SUP
A CaseStudy) (Manila:privately published, 1961), p. 20.
13. Valdepeñas, PhilippineManufacturing, p.57. tax
14. An increase in the magnitude of the errors and omission item in the balance of CO!
payments from a debit level of $48 million in 1948 to $93 million in 1949 supports this
view.
IS. The reserve requirement for demand deposits remained unchanged at 18 per Wit
cent from 1949 to 1959. Little use has been made of open-market operations in the Va
Philippines because of the absence of a significant bond market.
16. Valdepeñas, PhilippineManufacturing, p.29. liti
17. Loc. cit. Jui
18. Such consumption commodities as corned beef, fresh and frozen meat, spices, mu
medicines, rubber boots and shoes, and jute bags were on this short list.
19. Butter, cheese, raw coffee, tea, hams, inexpensive cotton, silk and rayon textiles, nil
cotton and rayon yarns, fresh oranges, apples, grapes and lemons, electrical batteries,
nails, inexpensive radios, refrigerators, paints, and commercial explosives illustrate the for
type of commodities on this list.
20. Examples of such goods were bakery products, breakfast foods, fresh and the
canned fish, canned and dried fruits, canned and dried meat, tobacco products, electric cha
stoves, musical instruments, lamps, writing paper, phonograph records, table and kitchen tiot
utensils, and inexpensive watches.
21. Leather manufactures, air-conditioning equipment, automobiles, small cameras,
furs, whiskey and wines, phonographs, perfumes, sporting goods, toys, fresh and canned 195
vegetables, and wood manufactures were among the items included in this list.n
59
NOTES 47
22.Golay, The Philippines, p. 28.
23. For example, the bank permitted students studying abroad to use a maximum
an of $2,400 per year for all living expenses exclusive of tuition and other expenses payable
to the educational institution. Funds for the latter purpose were made available, but it
• oP- was required that they be paid directly to the institution. For persons other than students
situated abroad, a maximum of $200 per month was permitted for the necessary living
rice, expenses of each authorized beneficiary or dependent residing in North, Central, or
a
- SouthAmerica, $50 per month for each such person in Asia, and $150 for each one re-
•1•
- sidingin other countries. Payments of life insurance premiums on nonpeso policies were
I 'P permitted if in force before December 9, 1949, but new or extended policies required the
C
approvalof the Central Bank.
'vet- 24. Valdepeflas, Philippine Manufacturing, Table 3.1, p. 30.
ided 25. See Golay, The Philippines, pp. 222—226; and Amado Castro, "Central Bank
of the Philippines" (1970; mimeo.), p. 4.
do-
26.Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1951, p. 15.
in 27. Even the prices of controlled items rose above their established ceilings. The
trial Central Bank found, for example, that in March of 1951, for a selected sample of 60
ines commodities, actual retail prices exceeded their ceiling levels by an average of 10.3 per
?46 cent.
iles 28. Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1951, p. 9.
29. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Report to the President of the
United States (Washington, D.C., October 5, 1950).
30. Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1951, pp. 14—15.
31. Specifically, tax refunds were made on such foodstuffs as rice, flour, canned
meat and fish, cattle and beef, and on textbooks and a long list of medicines and medical
supplies.
32. As is further explained in the section on tariff changes, this 17 per cent excise
tax on foreign exchange was replaced in 1957 by a 17 per cent special import tax on
of commodities. Furthermore, beginning in1957, this tax decreased by 1.7 percentage
this points each year until it was finally eliminated in 1966.
33. Virginia Yapinchay, "General Theories and Mechanics of Trade Restrictions
per with Emphasis on Philippine Experience," Central Bank News Digest, June 14, 1955;
the Valdepehas, Philippine Manufacturing, p. 60.
34. For an elaboration of these charges, see Caridad Carreon Semana, "Some Po-
litical Aspects of Philippine Economic Development" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,
June 1965). Apparently payments to government officials amounted in some cases to as
ces, much as 50 per cent of the value of foreign exchange licenses. See A. V. H. Hartendorp,
History of industry andTradeof the Philippines; the Magsaysay Administration (Ma-
iles, nila: Philippine Education Press, 1961), pp. 300—301.
ies, 35. Imports under "no-dollar remittance" referred to commodities for which no
the foreign-exchange allocation was made by the Central Bank.
36. In November 1972 the chairman of the Central Bank was made chairman of
and the Monetary Board. In addition, the president of the Philippine National Bank and the
tric chairman of the Development Bank were replaced by the director-general of the Na-
hen tional Economic Development Authority and the chairman of the Board of Investments.
37. Speech by A. Jison, reported in Central Bank News Digest, November 16, 1954.
ras, 38. Speech by I. M. Cuaderno, reported in Central Bank News Digest, March 26,
,)ed 1957.
39. Golay, The Philippines, p. 318.
4- -
48EXCHANGECONTROLS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1946—59
40.A. V. H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines (Ma-
nila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, 1958), p. 678.
41. The function of the National Economic Council was to coordinate government chr
economic policies. gra
42. Development expenditures by the government were concentrated on the con- and
struction of schools, hospitals, hydroelectric projects, communication facilities, and irri-
gation systems.
43. Cuaderno, Problems of Economic Development, p. 121.
44. In order of priority the categories were: Priority I, industrial loans; Priority II,
public utility loans; Priority III, real estate loans; and Priority IV, consumption loans.
45. Imports of essential producer raw materials for industrial plants approved by
the Central Bank and National Economic Council plus essential industries established
before December 9, 1949, required only a 50 per cent margin requirement, and capital
goods imports under deferred payment arrangements only a 25 per cent requirement.
Another important feature of this restraining measure was the clause stating that imports
"by the Philippine Government, its subdivisions, instrumentalities, government owned
and controlled corporations and all other government agencies and importations under
U.S. Public Law 480 and all ICA imports shall be given the same treatment as ordinary
imports."
46. President Garcia stated in a speech on July 2, 1959, that over a three- or four-
year period there would be a substantial relaxation of controls. Reported in Central Bank
News Digest, July 14, 1959, pp. 4—S.
47. Valdepehas, Philippine Manufacturing, p. 78.
48. His authority for doing so was based upon a 1954 law permitting him to raise
tariffs by 100 per cent or reduce them by 60 per cent.
49. Valdepeñas, Philippine Manufacturing, p. 81.
50. Philippine Tariff Commission, "General View of the Present Philippine Tariff
Structure" (July 31, 1970; mimeo.).
51. Industries listed in the appendix attached to the act as being conducive to its
objective of attaining "a stable and balanced" economy were iron and steel products,
processed local fuels, chemicals, copper and copper alloy products, refractors, processed
foods, textile and fiber manufactures from local raw materials, fertilizers, agricultural
equipment, refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment, raw plastic materials, porcelain
products, paper and paper products, medical and pharmaceutical products, rubber manu-
facturers, electric motors, office and school equipment and supplies, household and
kitchen utensils, and industrial abrasives.
52. John H. Power and Gerardo P. Sicat, The Philippines: Industrialization and
Trade Policies (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 80.
53. Philippine Chamber of Industries, Official Proceedings, Fifth National Conven-
tion of Manufacturers and Producers, Volume VIII, 1958.
54. Calculated from Philippine Chamber of Industries, Official Proceedings; and
Philippine Bureau of the Census and Statistics, Preliminary Report on BCS Annual Sur-
vey of Manufactures, 1958, Tables 1 and 2.
55. In 1958, the name of this organization was changed to the Development Bank
of the Philippines and its lending resources were increased.
56. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, Ten Years of the RFC (Manila, 1957).
57. U.S. AID Mission to the Philippines, A Survey of Foreign Economic Assistance
Programs in the Philippines, October 1964, p. 50.
58. Loc. cit.
59. Golay, The Philippines, pp. 299—300.r
NOTES 49
(Ma- 60. U.S. AID Mission, Survey of Assistance, p. 37.
61. The following items were specified:ore and concentrates of copper, iron,
tment chrome, manganese, quicksilver, coal, muscovado sugar, embroidery, pearl buttons, low-
grade hemp, saw logs, low-grade veneers and lumber, railway ties, industrial salt, cassava
con- and products made thereof, snake and crocodile skulls, and peanuts.
Iirri- 62. Golay, The Philippines, p. 160.
ty H,
oans.
ished
spital
nent.
ports
wned
inder
mary
four-
8ank
raise
lariff
o its
.ucts,
tural
elain
.anu-
and
and
iven-
and
Sur-
lank
ance